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Intended for college-preparatory students at the high school level, this unit investigates the changing tides in U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations and the reasons for the change. The focus of the unit is on a series of particular episodes such as the questions of famine relief in the 1920's, diplomatic recognition in the 1930's, World War II, the Berlin Blockade, the Hungarian Revolution, and the Cuban missile crisis. Introductions set each episode in context, and the student is asked to assess the wisdom and success of American policy-making. (Author)

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,  
1917-1965

Teacher and Student Manuals

(Public Domain Edition)

Ira Gorman

Committee on the Study of History  
Amherst, Massachusetts

TE 499 952

EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL  
SUBJECT TO REVISION  
PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

TEACHER'S MANUAL

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,  
1917-1965

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by the  
Committee on the Study of History, Amherst, Massachusetts  
under contract with the U. S. Office of Education  
as Cooperative Research Project #H-168.

One of the central facts of our age is the great struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. This unit is designed to give the students some perspective on this struggle. They can understand their world better, if they know how the conflict developed and what is at stake.

Another purpose is to give the readers some insight into the complexities of foreign policy. As voters or prospective voters their usefulness as citizens will be enhanced if they improve their ability to evaluate foreign affairs.

The question running throughout all the assignments is, how do you deal with a powerful nation whose philosophy proclaims that it is bent upon your ultimate destruction? It is not an easy question, but it is one that must be faced.

The most important documents in the first section are The Communist Manifesto and The Virginia Declaration of Rights. They are presented as representations of the American and Communist creeds to provoke the student into asking what it is that the United States stands for what it is that Russia stands for.

The individual answers that the students come up with should prove helpful in evaluating the actions of each nation in specific situations. It might be pointed out that there is often a wide discrepancy between what a nation says it believes in and what that nation does.

The teacher might ask if in reading the creeds as presented one would expect the nations subscribing to them to be mortal foes. In answering the question it can be noted that both nations believe in "equality" and "revolution," although these words may have different meanings. The strong American belief in individual rights might be contrasted with Communist ideas on the subject. Ideas on religion and private property can be discussed.

A small map of the world and DeTocqueville's prediction made in the 1830's is appended to the end of Section I. Before examining the specific encounters between the two countries, students could be asked if they think differences in doctrine are the sole explanation for the present rivalry. The fact that over one hundred years ago De Tocqueville could predict that the two nations would become the most powerful in the world suggests that the present struggle was not caused solely by differing creeds. Also past history of Europe and the current quarrel between China and Russia might be cited to illustrate that it is possible for great powers to feud even when they share common beliefs.

Section II begins with a rather long introduction. Its purpose is to inform the students about the conditions under which Russian-American relations began. The teacher might ask if the uninvited entry of Western troops upon Soviet soil and the subsequent aid that they gave to the anti-Communist Russians had any lasting effect upon our relations with Russia.

The main body of the section deals with the famine relief sent to Russia by the United States during the early 1920's. Here the central question is the wisdom of feeding the Russians in view of their proclaimed hostility.

Common sense dictates that one should not strengthen an enemy. The statement by George Kennan suggests that this is what we did. On the other hand there is always the possibility that kindness to an enemy might change the enemy's outlook. The fact that this did not occur is no proof that the gamble was not worth taking or that a similar gamble would not be worth taking in the future.

There is also the moral question. Could we in conscience allow the Russian people to starve? Should our quarrel with the Communists be taken out on innocent victims of all ages. Article 17 of The Virginia Declaration of Rights is included at the section's end to bring this issue into focus.

One more point can be raised. The introduction notes that famine relief was first thought of by the Americans partly as a political measure to be used against the Communists. Is it possible that the Communist perspective on the entire affair was colored by this fact?

The question of whether or not the United States should have recognized Russia in 1933 dominates Section III. The teacher might help the students to understand the act by asking the students to recall the special forces then at work. It was at the time of the depth of the depression which meant that the offer of increased trade was especially appealing. It was, also, the time when Hitler had just seized power in Germany and when the Japanese were showing expansionistic tendencies in the Orient. At such a time it was mutually advantageous for the United States and Russia to be on friendly terms.

A student's evaluation of Roosevelt's action may depend on the criteria he uses as a basis for decision. If he decides that the only valid reasons for recognizing Russia were to increase trade, obtain payments on long over due debts, and to end Communist propaganda and subversion, he may condemn Roosevelt. It can be rationally argued that past Communist statements and actions made them unworthy of trust. On the other hand a student accepting the above criteria as valid might simply state that the

risk was worth taking. He could say it was simply too bad that Roosevelt lost.

Students looking at the action from another vantage point, would probably applaud the recognition. They could point to the traditional recognition policy which states that recognition is not a means of showing approval or disapproval. It consists simply of exchanging diplomatic personnel with established governments. According to this school of thought the exchange of diplomats is in itself an advantage, for it gives us an opportunity to help our citizens upon occasion and an opportunity to learn enough about other nations so that we can formulate an intelligent policy in regard to them.

The question might come up as to why Russia desired recognition. One answer is that she wanted to strengthen her hand against the Germans and the Japanese. Another is that her Communist government had been considered by many as being not much better than an outlaw government. Recognition would have the effect of strengthening the government's prestige both at home and abroad. This last point is one that is frequently mentioned by opponents of recognition.

Section IV asks if our World War II relations were not based on a naive picture of the Russians. Roosevelt's critics point out that Soviet acts and statements toward the United States, the non-aggression Pact with Germany, the division of Poland, and aggression in the Balkan and Baltic countries and Finland had demonstrated that Russia was a totally immoral power. Thus, to accept her as our friend simply because we found that we shared a common enemy seems to them to have been sheer folly.

Specifically, many critics think that we could have cut off lend-lease aid once the Russians took the offensive against the Germans after the Battle of Stalingrad. It seems wrong to them that we should have continued to give aid that could be used by the Communists after the war for aggrandizement. The fact that we did give the kind of aid that could help post-war Russia is clearly suggested by Deane in the Strange Alliance.

Critics contend that our strategy during World War II had too limited a focus. Students who want to defend this line of reasoning could turn to the selection by Eliot Roosevelt. Here it is brought out that Roosevelt favored deploying allied troops on the basis of what would best help defeat the Germans. Unlike Churchill, he did not seem to consider the importance of the post-war battle lines. This is relevant for in general the Iron Curtain went down where the American and Russian troops met.

Students who choose to defend Roosevelt's policies can muster

strong arguments in their behalf. During the war the defeat of the Axis was our primary aim, and it is hard to knock a strategy aimed at this objective. Aid to the Russians was hardly wasted, since their victory at Stalingrad and their subsequent efforts played a crucial part in the struggle. They carried the heaviest burden in Europe for a long time in a mutual endeavor and at great sacrifice. The delicacy of our position is illustrated in the letter from Stalin and the comments by Roosevelt and Churchill.

As to employing our troops differently, the question can be raised whether or not Roosevelt would have been justified in using a strategy that would result in more American casualties. Finally, Roosevelt's Grand Design in which he pictured a world in which Americans and Russians would work together was a noble one. It is certainly true that a world which has had the United States and the Soviet Union at each other's throats has been a dangerous one. Again, to say the Grand Design did not work out perfectly is not to say it was not worth striving for. Could one be sure that the Russians would not change their attitudes toward us if we treated them with respect and consideration?

The aim of the introduction to Section V which concerns Berlin is to examine why we ended up with an occupation zone well behind Russian lines? Why would Roosevelt negotiate such an agreement?

It seems probable that Roosevelt favored a joint occupation because he realized that Berlin as capital of Germany, had a symbolic value to all of the major allies. The statement by Murphy indicates that Roosevelt did not balk at the location within Communist territory, because he either felt or hoped that the Russians would be cooperative when hostilities terminated.

The chief question raised in the main part of the section on Berlin is did America make the proper response to Russia's blockade of Berlin? In discussing the answer, students can easily defend either side. Those that answer affirmatively can point out that Russia's purpose was to push the United States out of Berlin. This attempt did not succeed. As Truman and Clay maintain we demonstrated to the people of the world that we would not be pushed around, even at a time when Russian troops on the European continent vastly outnumbered their Western counterparts. We also accomplished our objective without loss of life.

Those students who argue that the United States made an improper response can turn to Murphy for support. As he states, although Russian troop strength was vastly superior to ours, the United States possessed the atomic bomb. If the United States had been extremely tough in the situation and made the Russians

affirm the complete legality of our ground rights, it is possible that future Berlin crises of this nature would have been avoided. If we had shown that we were willing to fight over any threats to our position, it is possible that the Russians might have become more cautious all over the world including Korea. The question is whether the United States is the type of nation that can effectively use atomic diplomacy. If the Russians had resisted by force our efforts to use force on the ground, could the United States with its firm commitment to morality have backed up its demands by using nuclear weapons?

Before concluding the discussion in class, Russia's motivations might be discussed. It could be mentioned that a Russian victory would have greatly increased her world prestige. It might also be mentioned that large numbers of East Germans were fleeing to the West through the city which hurt both Communist prestige and the East German economy. Finally, Russia's actions were a protest to the unifying of West Germany. Did Russia, after suffering greatly from two closely spaced German invasions, have legitimate reason to fear Germany?

America's East European policy, particularly its response to the Hungarian Revolution, is under examination in Section VI. The chief questions are (1) whether we had a right to encourage the East Europeans to revolt if we did not intend to aid them if they did so and (2) did not the mere fact of our propaganda automatically obligate us to assist any East European nation that responded to this propaganda? It is necessary to ask the second question for it is possible that the propaganda effort was undertaken without all its implications having been completely thought out.

In formulating one factor that must be considered is what Russia's response to armed intervention would have been. Most likely the response would depend on an evaluation of the importance of Hungary to Russia. Some believe that she would never have used her military might against the United States merely to save a small European satellite. It simply would not be worth the risk of having the West retaliate with its full nuclear force.

Others think that Russia considered her East European satellites vital to her national defense. If she allowed Hungary to break away, the other East European nations would have attempted to follow suit. This would have been intolerable, and Russia would have had to prevent it no matter what the consequences. It can be added that, unlike the time of the Berlin Blockade, we possessed no monopoly on nuclear weapons.

If one believes that the United States should not have given military aid to the Hungarians, the question can be raised whether

there was any thing else we should have done. In the selections at the end of the unit various authors suggest breaking diplomatic ties with Russia, sponsoring a world wide economic boycott, and offering to take our troops from Western Europe if the Russians would leave Eastern Europe. The class can decide for itself if these suggested alternatives have any validity.

This leaves us with the question whether we should have encouraged unrest with our propaganda. On the one hand a policy that causes people needlessly to lay down their lives can easily be condemned. Conversely, does not the constant Russian program of propaganda and subversion in non-Communist nations need to be answered in kind?

Section VII asks the student to give his opinion as to how President Kennedy handled the Cuban missile crisis and to state what lessons can be learned from this episode.

Most commentators have supported Kennedy. His objective was to get the Russians to remove their missiles from Cuba, and this he accomplished. Due to his actions, the United States does not have to worry about a missile attack from Cuba for which there would be virtually no warning.

Criticism of Kennedy centers on the argument that he did not accomplish enough. Some feel that he should have insisted that on site inspection of Cuba be granted. This would have humiliated Castro and would have given us absolute guarantee that all missiles had been removed.

Other critics, such as David Lowenthal, think that Kennedy should have taken the occasion to solve the Cuban problem. They say that we should have demanded that Castro and his fellow Communists leave Cuba. In addition to ending the military threat, this might have removed the principal base for Communist subversion in Latin America.

In discussing how much we should have demanded from the Russians, the key issue comes down to an appraisal of how far the Russians could have been pushed. If they could have been intimidated into conceding more, how much more would they have conceded. If we had attempted to implement our demands by force, what would they have done? If we had attempted to throw Castro out bodily, would they have retaliated with nuclear weapons?

It seems that the Russian response would be partially dictated by how important Cuba seemed to them. Although Cuba does not seem to have the same importance to the Soviet Union as does Hungary, Lippmann suggests it can be questioned whether the Soviet

Union would have suffered the humiliation of having Castro removed.

Another consideration was how much force Russia could bring to bear. Obviously in the Caribbean, the United States is militarily stronger than Russia. The article by Rabinowitch suggests that one of the keys to the entire situation was that the United States possessed a much greater ability than did Russia to retaliate against a nuclear attack.

An interesting point for discussion is whether it can safely be concluded that the Soviet Union will always back down when brought to the brink of war? If we brought her to the brink of war in Hungary, would she have backed down? Is Rabinowitch correct in assuming that she will be less likely to back down in the future when her first strike nuclear capability becomes more equal to ours?

Finally, it might be worthwhile to discuss if the world is not in fact being divided up into spheres of influence. Was not the United States' decision not to interfere in Hungary a concession that Eastern Europe is a Soviet sphere of influence? Was not the Russian capitulation in 1962 a concession that ultimately the Caribbean belongs to the United States? If Russia and the United States have their spheres of influence, should China be allowed to have hers and if so is South East Asia a likely possibility?

Section VIII asks whether peaceful coexistence is possible? The first part of the section provides information indicating that Russia is becoming less rigid in her economic policies and in her suppression of individual freedom. The students can ask if these changes are meaningful and if it is possible that Russia is evolving into the type of society that will be easier for the West to get along with.

Information is presented about Russia's relation with China. The possibility of the deterioration of Russia's relationship to China raises the question of whether or not this will encourage her to seek greater accommodation with the West. It is worth noting that some commentators expect that worsening Soviet-Chinese relations will have an opposite effect. They contend that with China threatening Russia's leadership of the Communist world and continually calling her a paper tiger, the Soviet Union will be forced to become more militant, because if she is not militant toward the West and China is, China might assume the leadership of the Communist world.

The last part of the section deals more directly with the central issue of peaceful coexistence. The statements by Khrushchev

seem to indicate that the Russians realize how terrible war is and that while they will still attempt to expand Communist influence, they will use peaceful means.

Statements are also given indicating serious doubt as to the trustworthiness of the Russians. Proponents of this point of view maintain that peaceful coexistence is nothing more than a campaign endeavoring to convince us to lower our guard. A student or teacher who wants to defend this position would have only to turn to the Cuban missile crisis which took place some years after the Russians began this coexistence campaign. In fact, one of the selections in the last section shows a Russian note denying an intent to place offensive missiles in Cuba and mentioning the words "peaceful coexistence." This note was published in the Soviet press a month before the United States discovered the missiles.

Still, as the selections from Eugene Rabinowitch's article suggest, there are questions whose answers might support the American advocates of peaceful coexistence. Do Russian violations of the principles of coexistence render less valid expressions of horror at the thought of nuclear war? Even if Russia is still a dictatorship, is it not true that she seems to be losing some of her missionary zeal just as past revolutionary societies have in time lost theirs? Are not the agreements and cultural exchanges of the last few years helping to alleviate tensions, and is it possible that further agreements would help? Is the world not too dangerous a place to have its two leading military powers constantly at each other's throat?

To conclude study of the unit, it might prove beneficial to have the students write an essay. They could be told that Communist China is today a moderately powerful nation that will develop more power over the next twenty years as it builds its nuclear arsenal. In the coming years, China will present our policy planners with some difficult decisions. For their essay the students should draw up five hypothetical situations that might have to be faced. They should then proceed to tell how they would deal with these situations, supporting their decisions by drawing upon their knowledge of the history of Soviet-American relations.

In the essay the students could discuss situations parallel to those in the history of the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union: helping to feed China in an emergency, recognizing her, ever trusting her, using force to intimidate her, granting her spheres of influence, and considering the possibility that she will become more moderate with the passage of time.

Another possibility for a concluding assignment is to have

the students write an essay evaluating the following statement: "Our policies for dealing with the Russians have been riddled with mistakes and have all had disastrous consequences. In the 1920's the United States fed the Russians and this simply strengthened the Communists. Franklin Roosevelt established diplomatic relations with Russia in 1933, and the Soviet Union never lived up to any promise. During World War II we gave the Russians too much aid and followed policies which allowed Russia to enslave half of Europe. In 1948 we allowed the Russians to push us around in Berlin showing to the world and to the Russians that we lacked the resolution to fight. When the Hungarians followed our advice and revolted in 1956, the United States simply watched while the Russians brutally suppressed the freedom fighters. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 President Kennedy missed a marvelous opportunity to eliminate the Cuban problem. Today there is a terrible possibility that Russian talk of peaceful coexistence is going to cause the United States to lower its guard. This would be inexcusable, for everyone should realize it is sheer folly even to talk with the untrustworthy Russians."

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#### NOTE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

This unit was prepared by the Committee on the Study of History, Amherst College, under contract with the United States Office of Education. It is one of a number of units prepared by the Amherst Project, and was designed to be used either in series with other units from the Project or independently, in conjunction with other materials. While the units were geared initially for college-preparatory students at the high school level, experiments with them by the Amherst Project suggest the adaptability of many of them, either wholly or in part, for a considerable range of age and ability levels, as well as in a number of different kinds of courses.

The units have been used experimentally in selected schools throughout the country, in a wide range of teaching/learning situations. The results of those experiments will be incorporated in the Final Report of the Project on Cooperative Research grant H-168, which will be distributed through ERIC.

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This unit was initially prepared in the summer of 1965.

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### INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to pick up a newspaper, turn on the radio, or flick the television dial without hearing about the Soviet Union. This is because the Soviet Union is engaged with the United States in a great struggle. The stakes are high. A victory for one could have a momentous effect upon the social and political systems that will control the lives of the world's people. The risks are frightening. A misplay by either side could destroy all life on the planet.

In thinking about this rivalry some natural questions arise. How did the struggle begin? Whose fault is it? If the leaders of our government had formulated different policies, would the United States be in a stronger position today? What are the prospects for future Soviet-American relations? The documents presented in this unit will present these and other questions in such a way as to increase your understanding of the world in which you live.

SECTION IIDEOLOGY

1. The Russian Revolution of 1917 differed from many other revolutions in that it brought men to power who had many years before committed themselves to a particular philosophy. The clearest presentation of this philosophy is contained in The Communist Manifesto which was written by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx in 1848. Excerpts from this work are presented below:<sup>1</sup>

Marx declares that history has consisted of class struggles and that in his time the struggle is between the ruling Bourgeoisie and the proletariat.<sup>2</sup> He contends that the fall of the bourgeoisie is inevitable and he describes in detail the proletariat-controlled society that will follow. In the society that will follow the Communist revolution all class distinctions will cease to exist and all production will be in "the hands of a vast association" in which "the free development of each is the free development of all." He declares that the proletarians "have nothing to lose but their chains" and should use force to overthrow the present social system.<sup>3</sup>

2. Americans, also, claim to believe in certain principles. The Virginia Declaration of Rights which was drafted in 1776 by George Mason contains many of these principles:<sup>3</sup>

The statement declares that all men have "certain inherent rights to life, liberty, the means of acquiring and possessing property, happiness, safety, elected representatives, equal privileges under the government, suffrage (if there is "sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to the community"), due process of law when accused of a crime, freedom of press, and free exercise of religion. When a government is contrary to these purposes the majority of a community has the right to "reform, alter or abolish it."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto (Henry Regnery Company, New York, 1954), 9, 10, 18, 19, 25, 34, 35, 36, 37, 53, 54.

<sup>2</sup> The bourgeoisie are the owners or employers. The proletariat are the employees.

<sup>3</sup> "Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776," as quoted in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History (F. S. Crofts and Co., New York, 1945), 103-104.


3. In 1835 Alexis de Tocqueville published his classic, Democracy in America. The following famous passage often provokes amazement on the part of the modern reader:<sup>4</sup>

—Tocqueville indicates that Russia and America are destined to be great nations that, unlike other nations, have not reached their ultimate limits. He notes that, though their starting points and courses are different, both seem destined "to sway the destinies of half the globe." —

4. This world map shows both the United States and the Soviet Union. Does a careful look at it raise any questions about or give any insights into the nature of Soviet-American relations?

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<sup>4</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vintage Books, New York, 1960), I, 452.



SECTION II  
FAMINE RELIEF

Russia suffered greatly during World War I. Although the nation possessed great manpower resources, the Czarist government was too corrupt and disorganized to use them efficiently. It was the disillusionment and disgust with war that led to the overthrow of the ancient Czarist regime and the establishment of a moderate socialist regime under Alexander Kerensky early in 1917.

One of the first major decisions Kerensky had to make was whether to continue fighting on the side of England, France, and the United States against Germany and Austria. Under great Allied pressure he decided affirmatively. According to George Kennan, a leading American expert on Russian affairs, this was a fatal mistake. Kennan states that this commitment to a war that the nation was no longer in a position to wage greatly weakened Kerensky.

On October 26, 1917, the Communists overthrew the Kerensky government and proclaimed that they controlled the Russian government. One of their first acts was to enter into negotiations with Germany for the termination of hostilities. The Germans imposed very harsh territorial terms on the Russians, and the Russians broke off negotiations. Germany then launched a powerful military offensive which the Russians could not contain. Lenin and Trotsky, the Communist leaders, saw the weakness of their position and gave in.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, humiliated the Russian leaders in that it forced them to give up a large amount of territory. Still, they reasoned that it would help them, for it gave their

exhausted people time to rest and gave them time to strengthen their grip on the country. The treaty pleased Germany, which thus acquired not only territory but the opportunity of fighting one front rather than a two front war.

Only Russia's old allies were unhappy. They did not relish the prospect of having Germany transfer her military might from the Russian to the western front. They felt concerned about the large quantities of war materials that they had sent to Russia and which remained unattended in Russian ports. They also knew that a division of Czech soldiers loyal to the Allied cause remained in Russia and should be rescued.

While the outcome of the war was still in doubt, the British and the French went to President Wilson and put intense pressure upon him to join them in sending troops to Russia. He at first showed extreme reluctance. Finally, he agreed for a combination of reasons which included the supplies, the Czechs, and the second front. It appears, however, that the second front played much less of a part in his calculations than it did in those of the British and the French.

The American troops arrived in Russia during the summer of 1918, but not nearly in sufficient numbers to start a new front. It turned out that the Allies did not need another battle line. The great strength that America massed in the West overpowered the Germans. Late in 1918 the Germans surrendered.

To negotiate a settlement the Allies soon held a peace conference at Versailles. No invitation went out to the Russians. At the conference Winston Churchill, a British delegate, suggested that the Western powers use massive force to remove the Communists from power. This suggestion

received a veto from the heads of state. Still the Allies kept their troops in Russia until 1920 and they assisted Russian armies that had been fighting to overthrow the Communists.

During the peace negotiations Herbert Hoover, an American relief administrator, asked the allies to offer food to help relieve the great famine that had overspread Russia. Hoover said that the allies should stipulate that they run Russia's railroads while the aid was being administered in order to speed up the delivery of the relief supplies. He also wanted the aid to be distributed by local groups specifically elected for this purpose rather than by the Communists.

The Allies accepted the suggestion and made the proposal to the Russians, who turned it down. George Kennan stated that this surprised Hoover, because the famine was so bad that it was impossible to believe that any aid could be rejected. Kennan believes that the Communists realized that with Allied control of the railroads, they would not be able to move their forces quickly enough to put down disorders. They also realized that the election of groups to distribute the food would give power and authority to non-Communists. The net result of the acceptance of Hoover's offer, considering the chaos that prevailed, might well have been the downfall of the Communist regime.

Instead of becoming less severe, the Russian famine worsened. In 1921 the Russians asked the American Relief Administration for help. Although the A.R.A. was a private organization the United States government assisted it. It was still headed by Herbert Hoover, who was also Secretary of Commerce for President Harding. Having discussed the situation with his fellow cabinet members, Hoover then entered into negotiations with the Russians. The following selections deal with the famine and with

what the Americans decided to do about it. Many are drawn from Herbert Hoover's definitive account of the famine.

1. Descriptions of famine conditions had been sent to Herbert Hoover by American Relief Administration officials upon their arrival in Russia:<sup>1</sup>

〔The reports indicate that the lack of food is causing starvation, typhus and even cannibalism. The eating of food substitutes, dead animals, "and all manner of refuse" is reported.〕

2. These figures showing new typhus cases were reported by official Russian agencies:<sup>2</sup>

〔The number of typhus cases is broken down into months in the 1921-1923 period, indicating totals of 676,171 in 1921, 1,444,287 in 1922 and 67,925 in 1923. In the latter 9 months of 1923 no typhus cases were reported.〕

3. The following chart shows where the American Relief Administration received funds for its work in Russia:<sup>3</sup>

〔The chart indicates that the American Relief Administration received funds of \$87,634,058 from numerous sources, the largest single total coming from the Congressional appropriation of Grain Corporation profits (\$18,662,180).〕

4. Hoover here sums up his estimate of how many Russians his agency helped:<sup>4</sup>

. . . relief was given to about 14,000,000 adults. Adding the children, the total number of individuals who at one time or another were furnished the necessary margins to preserve life was estimated by our staff at more than 20,000,000.

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Hoover, An American Epic, Famine in Forty-Five Lands, the Battle on the Front Line 1914-1923 (Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1961), III, 440-41.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 475.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 451.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 462.

5. The Soviet government sent this message to Hoover on an elaborate scroll:<sup>5</sup>

The letter to Hoover expresses gratitude to Hoover and the American Relief Administration for the aid given the Russian people and indicates that all inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. will never forget the aid from the American people, "holding it to be a pledge of the future friendship of the two nations."

6. Russian government officials were not the only ones who thanked Hoover.<sup>6</sup>

A series of brief thank-you notes from Russian children for having received clothing from the American Relief Administration are re-printed.

7. Some events look different when viewed with a historical perspective.

The following items, again taken from Hoover's American Epic, show how the passage of time has affected the Russian outlook on the work of the A.R.A. A key question here is whether a change in the outlook of the Russian government makes our decision to aid the Russian people any more or less valid in the context of the 1921 situation in which it was made.<sup>7</sup>

The 1926 and 1950 editions of the Soviet Great Encyclopedia are quoted, indicating in the early edition modified and erroneous details of the relief and in the 1950 edition the only reference to the A.R.A. is the charge that it was helping enemies. Hoover is also quoted in the New York World-Telegram and Sun of July 2, 1959 as stating that the Russians have been trying to forget our aid to them in the 1921-23 period and have been making deceiving and inflammatory remarks about it. He quotes Kozlov and Izvestia to back up his assertion.

8. Shortly after assuming power, the Russian Communists helped to form a world federation of Communists called the Comintern parties. The Comintern invariably complied with the wishes of the Russian Communists.

Below is a resolution that the Comintern passed in the 1920's.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 514-515.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 516.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 519-521.

<sup>8</sup> Jane Degras, The Communist International (Oxford University Press, New York, 1956), I, 348.

/The resolution indicates that all Communists are committed to fight against all bourgeois societies as enemies with all means necessary and will not be hampered by any obligations.

9. An interesting comment on the connection between the work of the A.R.A. and the stability of the Russian government is made by George Kennan in his book Russia and the West:<sup>9</sup>

/Kennan contends that the Soviet government would not have been likely to have overcome its food and transportation crises without the A.R.A. relief. Thus, the A.R.A. helped the Soviet government to survive.

10. This last selection appears for the second time. It is a phrase from item 16 in the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 by George Mason.

. . . it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other.

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<sup>9</sup>

George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (New American Library, New York, 1961), 172.

SECTION IIIRECOGNITION

During the 1920's we helped to feed the Russians and traded with them, but we did not recognize the Soviet government. This meant that the United States did not officially acknowledge that the Communist government of Russia existed, and we did not exchange diplomatic personnel with it. If the United States had any official protest to make about the way in which the Russians treated American citizens or wanted to make some agreement that would benefit her nationals, there were no official channels available to help accomplish these ends. The same conditions existed for the Russian government.

Upon assuming the presidency in 1933 Franklin Roosevelt had to decide if he should recognize the Communist regime. The materials in this section bear upon his decision, reflecting the traditional policy of the United States government toward the question of recognizing foreign governments as well as the immediate situation.

1. In 1793 the United States recognized the French government that had been established by the French Revolution. At that time Thomas Jefferson, our first Secretary of State, observed:<sup>1</sup>

Jefferson contends that recognition cannot be denied a nation that was founded the same way the United States was and that the only essential factor is the "will of the nation." <sup>2</sup>

2. In 1818 Henry Clay, urging recognition of the newly independent Latin American republic, put forth a similar argument.<sup>2</sup> When he speaks

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<sup>1</sup>Committee on Russian-American Relations of the American Foundation, The United States and the Soviet Union (The American Foundation, Inc., New York, 1933), 12.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 12.

of a de facto government, he means that government which has actual control of the country.

Clay takes the position that after stability and order have been established, the de facto government ought to be recognized no matter what its character.

3. Again in 1852 Daniel Webster said:<sup>3</sup>

Webster argues that nations have a right to change governments or institutions "according to their own will." He notes that the United States has recognized the successive governments adopted by France.

4. While the previous statements obviously were not made with the Soviet Union in mind, Judge John Bassett Moore did have the Russians in mind when he spoke to the New York Bar Association in 1930. Read his statement carefully, for it is important that you understand it.<sup>4</sup>

Moore charges that the idea that Governments the United States recognizes must be approved by the United States is preposterous. He argues that this is not only contrary to international law that allows nations domestic independence but is also inconsistent with the fact that the United States has not conceivably approved of all the governments with which it has had diplomatic relations.

5. When the Communists took power in 1917, they issued two decrees that greatly affected our attitude toward them.<sup>5</sup>

The decrees indicate that private ownership of land is abolished without compensation and that all private and governmental loans are annulled.

6. Bainbridge Colby, who was Secretary of State under Wilson, clearly set forth his policy concerning recognition of the Soviet government in 1920.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 102, 93.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 35.

Colby says the United States will not recognize the present government of Russia because it deliberately breaks agreements with foreign nations and openly plans to develop revolutionary organizations in foreign countries, including the United States, in order to overthrow the present governments and replace them with Bolshevik rule.

7. Charles Evans Hughes succeeded Colby as Secretary of State when Harding was elected President in 1920. He, too, had to set forth his views on the Russian problem:<sup>7</sup>

Hughes argues that nations that are given diplomatic recognition should be able and willing to "discharge international obligations." He notes that Russia has annulled all loans from private individuals and foreign governments, including the United States.

8. Foreign Minister Litvinov made a statement on April 23, 1933 that President Roosevelt may have taken into consideration when he pondered recognition. Why might this statement have been of more interest in 1933 than if it had been made during the 1920's?<sup>8</sup>

The absence of diplomatic relations and a normal judicial basis for mutual trade relations also is naturally not without influence on our trade with the United States.

9. Pressure groups play a part in influencing policy decisions. One such group called itself the Committee on Russian-American Relations of the American Foundation. The following list indicates its more prominent members:<sup>9</sup>

Walter C. Alvarez, The Mayo Clinic  
 Curtis Bok, Chairman  
 Walter W. Cook, Professor of Law, Johns Hopkins University  
 Hugh L. Cooper, Consulting Engineer  
 Paul D. Cravath, Cravath, De Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 54.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., inside flap.

William N. Haskell, Commanding General, The National Guard of New York  
 George H. Houston, President, Baldwin Locomotive Works  
 Thomas W. Lamont, J. P. Morgan & Co.  
 Esther Everett Lape, Member in Charge  
 James D. Mooney, President, General Motors Export Company  
 Thomas A. Morgan, President, Curtiss-Wright Corporation  
 Roscoe Pound, Dean, Law School of Harvard University  
 J. H. Rand, Jr., President, Remington Rand, Incorporated  
 David B. Robertson, President, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen  
 William Scarlett, Protestant Episcopal Bishop Coadjutor of Missouri  
 Frank W. Taussig, Professor of Economics, Harvard University  
 Jacob Viner, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago  
 Allen Wardwell, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner and Reed.

10. World conditions other than our immediate relations with Russia entered into Roosevelt's recognition decision. Secretary of State Hull quotes in his Memoirs the advice he gave Roosevelt in 1933.<sup>10</sup> What does he mean when he refers to "a dangerous period both in Europe and Asia?"

Hull advised Roosevelt to recognize Russia, though a large number of people opposed such recognition. He contends that Russia was a traditional friend up until the end of the World War, has been peacefully inclined, and might be a big help in helping to stabilize the dangerous situation in Europe and Asia.

11. President Roosevelt decided in November 1933 to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Upon this occasion the Soviet Union made certain promises to the United States, two of which are contained in a note sent by Foreign Minister Litvinov to President Roosevelt on November 16, 1933:<sup>11</sup>

Litvinov promises that the Soviet Union will not interfere in the internal affairs of the United States and will not permit the establishment of any organization which aims to overthrow the social or political order of the United States.

<sup>10</sup> Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948), I, 297.

<sup>11</sup> Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, New York, 1953), III, 36.

12. One item not completely settled by the recognition treaty was the claims that the United States government and its citizens held against the Soviet government. Foreign Minister Litvinov discussed the status of these claims at a reception given in New York on November 25, 1933:<sup>12</sup>

*[/Litvinov expresses the view that both sides want to settle the matter and that the means of settlement "are not very far apart."/]*

13. As the preceding documents throw light on some American expectations upon resuming diplomatic relations with Russia, the following give some indication of how well these expectations were fulfilled. If you decide that they were not satisfactorily fulfilled, does this make Judge Moore's assignment less valid? Can you see any advantage in having American diplomats in Moscow?

Trade with Russia is recorded in Thousands of Dollars in this table from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States.<sup>13</sup>

<u>1926-30 Average</u>		<u>1931-35 Average</u>		<u>1936-40 Average</u>	
<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Imports</u>
77,666	17,592	33,022	13,040	57,917	24,223

14. Cordell Hull in his Memoirs discusses a conversation he had with the Russian ambassador to the United States on March 26, 1934:<sup>14</sup>

*[/Upon being asked why credit was not being extended to Russia, Hull tells Ambassador Troyanovsky that the negotiations over the issue of the Russian debt are far from being resolved as Litvinov offered a resolution that was not at all acceptable; and since the "misunderstanding is so wide", it is felt that all commercial and financial relations should be brought to a standstill until the matter can be clarified./]*

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>13</sup> Statistical Abstract of the United States 1947 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1948), 916.

<sup>14</sup> Cordell Hull, Memoirs, 303.

15. Cordell Hull described an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union during the summer of 1935. The American note stated:<sup>15</sup>

*After the American government stated that it "anticipates serious consequences" if the Soviet Government does not prevent further acts which are contrary to their pledge to the United States, the Soviets replied that the Soviet Government does not take upon itself any obligations with regard to the Communist International. Hull then issued a note stating that if the Soviet Government could not prevent subversive activities of the Communist International the relations between the two countries could be seriously impaired.*

16. It should be noted that the Communist Party in the United States caused little trouble during the next few years. The Russian government, fearing an attack from either or both Germany and Japan, ordered the Communist Parties of the world to form a common united front with democratic parties against the fascists.

The United Front lasted until 1939 when Russia signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. This signing occurred at a time when the United States had failed to assert herself actively against the rising dictatorships, and England and France had just demonstrated a lack of resolution by signing an agreement in Munich, Germany, which allowed Hitler to take much of Czechoslovakia. The pact read in part:<sup>16</sup>

*The U.S.S.R. and Germany agreed not to take up arms against each other, but in a "secret Additional Protocol" they also agreed that the northern frontier of Lithuania would represent "the frontier of the spheres of interest" of both countries with respect to the Balkan States; that the Narev, Vistula, and San Rivers would serve as the boundary for their respective spheres of interest in Poland, and that the U.S.S.R. had an interest in Bessarabia in South-Eastern Europe with which Germany would not interfere.*

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 305.

<sup>16</sup> Jane Degras, Soviet Documents, III, 360-361.

SECTION IVWORLD WAR II

Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. Britain and France realized that nothing but force could stop him and accordingly declared war. In the fighting that followed, German troops demolished the Western armies. The French surrendered, and the British were very lucky to be able to evacuate most of their troops from the continent. Hitler then began a campaign to bomb Britain into submission.

While the war progressed in the West, the Russians took full advantage of the situation. According to the secret provisions of the non-aggression pact, they occupied part of Poland. They also decided to expand their influence in the Balkans and in Finland. When the Finnish people resisted Russia fought a war with the small nation.

By June 1941 the military situation looked slightly different. The British, bolstered by American aid and protected by a brave and capable air force, had demonstrated that they could not be bombed into submission. Hitler did not trust the Russians and did not dare to attempt a full scale invasion of Britain while the Russians could stab him in the back. He subsequently amazed the world in June 1941 by ordering a surprise invasion of Russia.

1. The following selections are from the speech that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill broadcast over the British Broadcasting System upon hearing of the Russian invasion:<sup>1</sup>

Churchill interprets Germany's attack on Russia as a prelude to an attack on England and eventually the Western Hemisphere. He contends, therefore, that the Russian danger is the danger of both Britain and the United States also and that exertions must be redoubled to "strike with united strength while life and power remain."/

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<sup>1</sup> Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, The Grand Alliance (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1950), 372-373.

2. World War II brought almost unbelievable suffering to the Russian people. In looking back at Russia's war-time experience President Kennedy in a public speech said:<sup>2</sup>

/Kennedy briefly describes the great suffering of the Russian people and destruction of Russian property, e.g. 20,000,000 lives lost, millions of homes "burned or sacked," one-third of its European territory "turned into a wasteland."/

3. Alexander Werth in his book Russia at War 1941-1945 quotes two first-hand reports of the conditions that existed among the people.<sup>3</sup>

/The first report tells of people using food substitutes that under ordinary circumstances are not considered edible and indicates that people were dying in all kinds of circumstances, some of which are described. The second report tells of people being buried without coffins under unhygienic circumstances, often in large common graves./

4. These figures from The World Almanac speak louder than many words.<sup>4</sup>

<u>Country</u>	<u>Peak Strength</u>	<u>Battle Deaths</u>
United Kingdom	5,120,000	244,723
United States	12,300,000	291,557
USSR	12,500,000	7,500,000

If American losses were far smaller than Russian losses for the entire war, the differential between them is even much greater for the first years of fighting. It was not until 1942 that we invaded North Africa, 1943 that we engaged the Germans in Italy, and 1944 that we launched our massive assault on Normandy.

5. The next selections from Winston Churchill's Hinge of Fate indicate how the Russians felt about having to carry the brunt of the war and how

<sup>2</sup> As quoted in Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941-1945 (E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York, 1964), xi.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 324-325.

<sup>4</sup> The World Almanac and Facts and Figures for 1965 (New York World-Telegram and Sun, New York, 1965), 735.

the Americans and British reacted to the Russians. The selections include a letter from Stalin to Churchill.<sup>5</sup>

Stalin's letter to Churchill indicates a dissatisfaction with the British decisions to stop sending war materials to the Soviet Union via the northern route and to postpone the opening of the western front until 1943, instead of 1942. Implicit within Stalin's letter is an accusation of British contract breaking. Although not considering it worth arguing, Churchill rebuffs the charges from Stalin, declaring that no such contracts were made and notes that Roosevelt agreed with this view. Roosevelt is then quoted as saying that Stalin should be told what American and British plans are in 1942, "without any qualifications."

6. In February 1943 Stalin received a message from his commander at the front. It signified that the German advance had been halted and that a turning point in the war had been reached. Its controlled language does not reveal the enormous numbers of lives that had to be lost before it could be sent.<sup>6</sup>

The report indicates that the German forces were stopped at Stalingrad and that 22 divisions were "destroyed or taken prisoner."/

7. At the very beginning of the war the United States began making a concentrated effort to assist the Russians. Under The Lend-Lease program this nation began shipping supplies to the Soviet Union. The program is described in the following selections from The Strange Alliance by John R. Deane. Deane served as the head of the American Military Aid Mission to Russia during World War II.<sup>7</sup>

Deane describes in detail the eleven billion dollars worth of supplies and services that were sent to the Soviet Union from the United States, both for the war-time prosecution and post-war reconstruction. He contends that such aid was a major element in the Russian and allied victory./

<sup>5</sup>Winston Churchill, The Second World War; The Hinge of Fate (Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1950), 270-272.

<sup>6</sup>Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 543.

<sup>7</sup>John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (The Viking Press, New York, 1947), 87, 93, 95, 100.

8. On the following chart, drawn from the 1947 Statistical Abstract of the United States, each unit represents a thousand dollars (50 on the chart means \$50,000):<sup>8</sup>

Lend Lease Exports to Russia  
in Thousands of Dollars

1936-1940 Average (Pre-lend lease)	57,917
1941	107,524
1942	1,425,442
1943	2,994,836
1944	3,473,257
1945	1,838,282.

9. An American President is always faced with a large number of important decisions. During war the number and magnitude of these decisions is greatly increased. A passage from As He Saw It by the president's son, Elliot Roosevelt, sheds light on a crucial choice that Franklin Roosevelt had to make. It describes a scene which took place at the 1943 Teheran Conference.<sup>9</sup>

Elliot Roosevelt relates a conversation he had with his father in which F. D. R. took the position that the Allies ought to start just one major front on the West, rather than opening another front in the Balkans in order to prevent the Russians from gaining a hold in Central Europe, as Churchill contended. Roosevelt's uppermost consideration was how to win "as short a war as possible" at the risk of the fewest American lives. He was not as fearful as Churchill of Russia's post-war strength.

10. Franklin Roosevelt had a concept of what the post-war world should be which is revealed in a speech he made to the nation on December 24, 1943 about the Cairo and Teheran Conferences. Although the passage presented here does not specifically mention an international organization, of what organization is Roosevelt obviously speaking?<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Statistical Abstract . . . 1947, 916.

<sup>9</sup> Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, 1946), 183-186.

<sup>10</sup> Donald Day, Franklin D. Roosevelt's Own Story (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1951), 404.

Roosevelt contends that all "freedom-loving peoples" should unite and cooperate in protecting the rights of all nations -- weak or strong -- and in using force to keep peace.

11. Some writers have criticized Roosevelt for depending too much on personal contact for influencing Stalin and for being too soft on the Russians. Edward R. Stettinius, who served during World War II first as Director of Lend-Lease and later as Secretary of State, answered these critics:<sup>11</sup>

Stettinius argues that Roosevelt decided to meet with Stalin personally because only he made the decisions for Russia. He points out that Roosevelt realized the dangers of negotiating with the Russians but he felt that risks were necessary for achieving peaceful world order.

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<sup>11</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1949), 25-26.

SECTION VBERLIN

Berlin was the capital of Germany from the time it was united in 1871 until the Nazis met complete defeat in 1945. From 1945 until the present it has been the source of much friction between the United States and the Soviet Union.

1. Shortly before World War II ended, Germany's major foes met to reach decision on questions relating to occupation. This map shows the occupation zones they drew up:<sup>1</sup>

*[The map shows the British, French, American, and Russian zones in Germany, as well as the former German territory now taken over by Poland.]*

2. It is sometimes said that President Roosevelt, when discussing Germany with Stalin did not press for the most favorable terms he could have obtained. In particular it is said that the United States should have insisted on getting control of an access route to Berlin rather than accepting Russian control of all the territory around the city. If this be true, some explanation of why Roosevelt was not more aggressive is found in the following selection from Diplomat Among Warriors by Robert Murphy, who served Roosevelt in a variety of diplomatic roles during the war.<sup>2</sup>

*[Roosevelt declared a need to demonstrate to the Russians that Americans desired to cooperate with them and that Germany would be a proving ground of our desire.]*

3. After the conclusion of World War II, relations between the Soviet

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<sup>1</sup>Thomas A Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., New York, 1955), 780.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Pyramid Books, New York, 1965), 255.

Union and the United States steadily worsened, and that struggle between the two super powers known as the Cold War began. One of the first encounters took place at the United Nations. The United States proposed that an international commission be established to ensure that no nation had nuclear weapons and to supervise the pooling of atomic knowledge for peace-time use. The Russians vetoed the proposal. Soon an iron curtain descended between Eastern and Western Europe. Contrary to wartime agreements, the Soviet Union imposed Communist governments on those nations occupied by Russian troops. She refused either to allow free elections or to withdraw her troops.

The United States responded to the Communist challenge. When it became evident that Greece and Turkey needed large amounts of aid to prevent them from going Communist, America sent it. In 1947 the United States, under a program known as the Marshall Plan, sent massive amounts of aid to facilitate economic recovery in Western Europe. The primary aim of the program was to eliminate the poverty upon which, in the view of many observers, Communism thrives. Interestingly enough, we even offered to send aid to Russia and to the East European nations, but this offer was rejected.

By 1948 the chief bone of contention between East and West was Germany. In 1946 the United States and Great Britain had merged their zones under a joint occupation government. In 1948 there was evidence that the French zone would soon be included.

Many times in the past the allies had approached the Russians about joining them and working for a united Germany. The Russians never cooperated. When the three Western nations decided to replace the common currency that

had circulated in all of occupied Germany with a special western currency, the Russians balked. The Russians realized that this anti-inflation measure would serve as an important step in the establishment of an independent Western Germany.

Berlin soon became the focus of Russian policy. Located well within the Russian Zone, it was the West's most exposed nerve. But if it was an exposed nerve for the West, it was a sore one for the Communists. Thousands fled from Communist rule in Eastern Europe through Berlin. General Lucius Clay, who in 1948 served as the American Military Governor of Germany, outlines the actions taken by Russia.<sup>3</sup>

Clay traces the developments, step by step, which led to the blockade of all transportation and freight shipments between Berlin and Western Germany.<sup>4</sup>

4. The institution of the Berlin Blockade faced our government with difficult decisions. These are discussed by Robert Murphy in Diplomat Among Warriors.<sup>4</sup> At the time of the blockade, Murphy was the head State Department official in Germany. The Reuter he refers to is Ernst Reuter, the man who had recently been elected mayor of Berlin.

Murphy discusses the factors that went into decision to airlift goods to the West Berliners rather than defying the Soviets by attempting to ship goods by road. He relates how the Air Force and Berliners took up the challenge and were able to keep West Berlin supplied with all necessary goods, though the Berliners had to put up with constant challenges.

5. The next two passages which are taken from The Forrestal Diaries, reflect what American policy makers at the highest level considered doing

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<sup>3</sup>Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Doubleday and Co., Inc., New York, 1950), 362.

<sup>4</sup>Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356.

in an emergency. James Forrestal was at the time Secretary of War. The first passage represents a condensation by Walter Millis, the editor, of the diaries. The second is in Forrestal's own words.<sup>5</sup>

*(The views Forrestal heard from Dulles, Clay, Churchill and Truman were that, if necessary, the United States would and should use the atomic bomb in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.)*

6. Because of the seriousness of the dispute and the tension that it raised, many uttered a sigh of relief on May 4, 1949, when the following four power communique was issued:<sup>6</sup>

*(The communique indicates that the Soviet Union has lifted all restrictions on communications, transportation and trade between Western Germany and the Western Zone of Berlin.)*

7. Once the crisis was over, it was time to judge the American response to the crisis. Below are comments on the crisis by Harry S. Truman, Lucius Clay, and Robert Murphy. Most newspapers, magazines, and prominent Americans agreed with Clay and Truman. Does this mean that Murphy is wrong? Harry Truman:<sup>7</sup>

*(Truman contends that the American response to the Berlin blockade, though difficult, was a demonstration to Western Europeans and Russians that we would resist threats on European freedom from the Russians.)*

Lucius Clay:<sup>8</sup>

*(Clay states that the lifting of the blockade was "a victory for the forces of freedom" and helped give "courage to those who believe in freedom everywhere.")*

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<sup>5</sup>Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, (The Viking Press, New York, 1951), 488-489, 487.

<sup>6</sup>O. M. Von Der Gablentz, Documents on the Status of Berlin 1944-59 (Research Institute of the Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, München, 1959), 95.

<sup>7</sup>Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol. I, Year of Decisions (Doubleday and Company, New York, 1965), 131.

<sup>8</sup>Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, 392.

Robert Murphy:<sup>9</sup>

Murphy argues that the United States should have challenged the Russians when they blockaded Berlin and regrets his association with a decision which he feels caused the Soviet Union to downgrade American "determination and capability."

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<sup>9</sup>Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 317.

## SECTION VI

### THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

Americans in 1945 did not realize that a long struggle with the Communists was in the offing. The defeat of Germany and Japan meant to them that it was time to demobilize the armies and to return to peacetime pursuits. Slowly, as the Soviet Union by a series of acts clearly demonstrated expansionist tendencies, our State Department officials drew up a general policy to deal with the Russians.

1. This policy was clearly stated in an article appearing in the July 1947 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs. It was generally attributed to George Kennan, who at the time served as the head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff:<sup>1</sup>

[Kennan says the Soviet pressure can only be contained by counter-force at those constantly shifting points where they put pressure on.]

2. This containment policy remained the focus of our foreign policy throughout the Truman years which lasted until 1952. Its most conspicuous application came in 1949. During this year the Communist armies of North Korea, after being trained and supplied by the Russians, invaded South Korea. The United States immediately sent forces to aid the South Koreans and for three years was the main contributor to a United Nations army that fought the North Koreans and their Chinese allies to a stalemate.

The election in 1952 of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President and Eisenhower's appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State gave a new focus to our foreign policy. These men were particularly concerned about the fate of the East Europeans. They resented the fact that the  
<sup>1</sup>x, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV, No. 4 (July, 1947), 576.

Russians, as soon as the war was over, did not hold free elections and evacuate their troops.

The following statements are typical of many pronouncements by Eisenhower and Dulles. Similar statements were beamed to the East European nations by radio. The first two are from speeches by Dulles.<sup>2</sup>

Dulles expresses a moral commitment to do more than "contain" the Soviet world and states that we should make known that we want and expect "liberation to occur." He also notes the Soviet oppression of the Lithuanian-Estonian nations. He sends best wishes to them, and expresses confidence that they will have "a new day of freedom."/

The third statement is from a resolution which President Eisenhower sent to Congress:<sup>3</sup>

Whereas, The people of the United States, true to their tradition and heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of any peoples; and

Whereas, It is appropriate that the Congress join with the President in giving expression to the desires and hopes of the people of the United States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate and House concurring,

Join in proclaiming the hope that the peoples who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.

3. Concurrent with the election of Eisenhower, dramatic events took place behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin died in 1953. Following his death a power struggle started among Russian leaders. While the struggle took place, the Russian leaders relaxed the harsh police controls that had been in effect in all Communist nations. They also looked for a relax-

<sup>2</sup>John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, No. 20 (May 19, 1952), 153-154; and Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII (February 23, 1953), 330.

<sup>3</sup>Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII (February 23, 1953), 353-354.

action in international tensions. Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito, the one Communist leader in Eastern Europe who had been able to remove his country from Stalin's control, was wooed by Moscow. The Russians became less belligerent toward the West. They began to talk about peaceful co-existence. As proof of their good intentions, they removed their troops from Austria on the condition that Austria should remain neutral.

Against this backdrop, 1956 became a particularly key year. At a time when the power struggle in Russia had narrowed to a contest between Nikita Khrushchev and V. M. Molotov, Khrushchev made a surprising "secret" speech to a Russian Communist Party Congress. The speech roundly attacked Stalin as being a cruel dictator who had used police methods to repress the Russian people.

A copy of the speech fell into the hands of the United States Department which published the speech. Publication seemed to increase the ferment that had been brewing in Eastern Europe for some time. Riots took place in Poland. Wladyslaw Gomulka recently released from prison, was elected first secretary of the Polish Communist Party. He soon made it clear that although he intended to pursue a more independent course than past Polish Communist governments, he did not intend to remove Poland from the Russian orbit. The Russians left him alone.

The Hungarians then became restive. On October 24th, riots began in which Russian military personnel were attacked. Ex-Premier Imre Nagy, by popular demand, again became Premier. The Russians seemed at first to look with favor upon Nagy. At his request they withdrew their armed forces from the Hungarian capital of Budapest and seemed ready to leave the country. One top officials in the Russian government,

Anastas Mikoyan, conferred with Nagy and seemed to go along with the suggestion that a free election be held and that Hungary be allowed to leave the Communist European military alliance.

While these events took place, President Eisenhower made the following statement on October 25, 1956:<sup>4</sup>

The United States considers the development in Hungary as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the Hungarian people. The demands reportedly made by the students and the working people clearly fall within the framework of those human rights to which all are entitled, which are affirmed in the charter of the United Nations, and which are specifically guaranteed to the Hungarian people by the treaty of peace to which the Government of Hungary and of the Allied and Associated Powers, including the Soviet Union and the United States are parties.

And on November 2, 1956:<sup>5</sup>

In order to help the Hungarian people in this hour of need, I am authorizing immediately an initial allocation of \$20 million from the funds appropriated by the Congress for emergency use, to be employed for food and other urgent relief necessary for the alleviation of their sufferings.

4. On November 1, 1956 the situation in Hungary took a turn for the worse. Nagy, therefore, sent the following note to United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjold:<sup>6</sup>

Your Excellency

Budapest

. . . I have already mentioned in my letter of November 1st that new Soviet military units entered Hungary and that the Hungarian Government informed the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest of this fact, at the same time terminated the Warsaw Pact, declared the neutrality of Hungary, and requested the United Nations to guarantee the neutrality of the country.

On the 2nd of November further and exact information, mainly military reports, reached the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, according to which large Soviet military units crossed the border of the country marching toward Budapest. . . .

<sup>4</sup>Department of State Bulletin, XXXV (November 5, 1956), 700.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. (November 12, 1956), 764.

<sup>6</sup>United Nations Document S/3726, November 2, 1956.

At the same time, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic forwarded concrete proposals on the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary as well as the place of negotiations concerning the execution of the termination of the Warsaw Pact and presented a list containing the names of the members of the Government's delegation. Furthermore, the Hungarian Government made a proposal to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest to form a mixed committee to prepare the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

I request Your Excellency to call upon the Great Powers to recognize the neutrality of Hungary and ask the Security Council to instruct the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to start the negotiations immediately.

I also request Your Excellency to make known the above to the Members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my highest consideration.

Imre Nagy

5. After November 1st events reached a climax. The story of these events is told in the following passages.

While reading these passages, you should keep in mind that Hungary was not at the time the only area of the world in turmoil. The Egyptians had recently nationalized the Suez Canal. For revenge the British and the French joined with Israel in an attack on Egypt. Consequently every time the West mentioned Hungary either in or out of the United Nations, the Russians brought up the Suez crisis. Russia's spokesmen continually threatened to use nuclear might against the two Western nations, if they did not evacuate troops from Egypt.

On Sunday November 4, 1956 the Hungarian people heard these messages over the official government radio station.<sup>7</sup>

Nagy announced that the Hungarian People's Republic forces were fighting the Soviet forces who were "trying to overthrow the legal Hungarian democratic government." He stated that the Government was still secure. Later, the Hungarian Government requested the Soviet army not to shoot as they were friends. Then the Association of Hungarian Writers pleaded for help from "leaders of intellectual life in all countries."

<sup>7</sup>Free Radio Kossuth as reprinted in Melvin J. Lasky, The Hungarian Revolution (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957), 228.

On the same day the Associated Press Bureau in Vienna received a teletype communication from the offices of the Hungarian News Agency:<sup>8</sup>

/The message described the fighting going on outside the offices of the Hungarian News Agency and tells of a rumor that "American troops will be here within one or two hours." Faith that Hungary can rebuild is expressed but hope is also expressed that "the U. N. meeting won't be too late."/

While the fighting went on in Hungary, the diplomats at the United Nations attempted to act.<sup>9</sup>

/It is indicated that the Soviet Union vetoed a U. S. resolution which proposed a censure of Russian military action in Hungary. Henry Cabot Lodge, the U. S. representative, said that "the will of the world organization had been 'thwarted' by the Soviet veto...."/

President Eisenhower also expressed his sentiments in a message to Bulganin:<sup>10</sup>

/Eisenhower claims that the Soviet actions in Hungary have shocked Western opinion. He announced that he is discussing ways that the United States could assure the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and Hungary's self-determination./

Finally, Radio Moscow told the world what was happening:<sup>11</sup>

/It is announced that the "reactionary" forces have been crushed and that a new government, headed by Janos Kadar, has been formed./

Just before the Russians crushed all resistance, Leslie B. Bain gained the following interview with Bella Kovacs which he wrote up for The

Reporter Magazine.<sup>12</sup> Kovacs served as Minister of State in the Nagy government.

<sup>8</sup>Hungarian News Agency message by teletype line to the Associated Press, as reprinted in Ibid., 231.

<sup>9</sup>Lindsey Parrot, The New York Times, November 4, 1956, as reprinted in Ibid., 232.

<sup>10</sup>The New York Times, November 5, 1956, as reprinted in Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Radio Moscow, as reprinted in Ibid., 239-240.

<sup>12</sup>The Reporter, December 13, 1956, as reprinted in Ibid., 243.

✓Kovacs contends that the revolutionary goals of the Nagy government were being achieved too fast for the Russians and they feared free elections. He claims that Nagy's declaration of neutrality did not bring on the Russian repressive actions but that a threat to trade between the Communist countries in the area might have, though they had no plans to interrupt economic cooperation.✓

6. After the Hungarian Revolution many articles concerning it appeared in American magazines. In the December 17, 1956 edition of The New Republic Walter Ridder wrote about the relationship between United States propaganda and the Revolution.<sup>13</sup>

✓Ridder notes the misinterpretations of the Radio Free Europe broadcasts which he feels the Hungarian freedom fighters made. He feels that the interpretation that Americans would actively support a revolution was understandable considering the conditions, but that as far as he knows no such explicit statement was made by RFE.✓

7. An article appeared in the National Review November 10, 1956 which made clear what the author thought the West should have done during the Revolution:<sup>14</sup>

✓The author of the article makes the argument that the Communist gains from 1917 on could have been stopped by outside forces, but that each time when the opportunities were bypassed the Communists gained in strength and thus an increasing amount of counter-force was necessary to crush them. Every time an opportunity is wasted "by a pacifistically petrified West" the Communists gain a further triumph.✓

8. A week earlier an editorial in the same magazine had made another observation and recommendation:<sup>15</sup>

✓The editorial suggests that the only honorable response to the Soviet actions in Hungary is to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.✓

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<sup>13</sup>Walter Ridder, "Our Propaganda in Hungary," The New Republic (December 17, 1956), 12-13.

<sup>14</sup>W. S., "The Hungarian Slaughter," National Review (November 10, 1956), 10.

<sup>15</sup>Editorial, National Review (November 3, 1956), 3.

9. America on November 17, 1956 printed a letter from the Chairman of the American Friends of the Captive Nations:<sup>16</sup>

[/The letter suggests to the President that he call an emergency session of Congress to consider the use of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union because of the Soviet aggression in Hungary.]

10. Richard Lowenthal's observations appeared in The New Republic on November 26:<sup>17</sup>

[/Lowenthal claims that the Russians had no choice but to crush the Hungarian uprising as Hungary would have become "a new Austria or at best a new Finland" if they had not. He suggests that the United States could have used the sympathies of the uncommitted nations of Asia more effectively and, secondly, it could have suggested an American withdrawal from Western Europe in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.]

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<sup>16</sup> America, (November 17, 1956), 185.

<sup>17</sup> The New Republic (November 26, 1956), 13-14.

SECTION VII  
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

From the day in January 1959 that Fidel Castro overthrew the Cuban dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the United States found that it had problems. Castro, despite the fact that the United States recognized his regime immediately after he seized power, seemed to resent the United States. He seized the property of American citizens along with that of Cubans in his efforts to socialize the island. When the United States government asked that its citizens receive compensation, the request met with a firm refusal.

The United States reacted by reducing its Cuban trade. Castro retaliated by signing a five year trade agreement with Russia and by seizing the remaining property in Cuba belonging to United States citizens. In one of his last official acts President Eisenhower severed diplomatic ties with Cuba.

President Kennedy, upon assuming office early in 1961, found that plans had been formulated to solve the Cuban problem. The Central Intelligence Agency was training Cuban refugees for an invasion. Kennedy did not interfere with these plans. On April 17 he ordered that the invasion be launched from American ships, but he refused permission for the use of American troops or planes.

The result was a fiasco. Castro's forces quickly demolished the would-be invaders, many of whom were killed and captured. Because of its role, the United States was branded an aggressor by many throughout the world. Yet at the same time it had not done enough to get rid of the irksome Castro.

In the years that followed both sides continually called each other names. In addition to name calling, the United States tried to bring Castro to his knees by convincing other nations to follow our example of cutting off trade with Cuba. Castro, for his part, irritated us by announcing that he and his government were Communist.

1. By the autumn of 1962 the United States was becoming increasingly worried by a build up of Russian men and supplies on the island. When the United States questioned Russia about this build up, Tass, the Soviet news agency, released a dispatch dated September 11, 1962:<sup>1</sup>

[The dispatch stated the Soviet Union's desire for peaceful coexistence and insisted that the Soviet Government saw no need for having nuclear weapons beyond its borders.]

2. In October a high flying American intelligence flight over Cuba revealed that the Russians were installing missiles with a potential range of 2,000 miles. It could be seen that before long the missiles would be operational. After a few sessions with his closest advisors in which a hot debate raged over possible American actions, Kennedy acted. On October 22nd the President appeared on national television and announced that the Russians were installing missiles. He said that the United States had established a blockade of Cuba. All ships approaching the island would be searched and any containing offensive weapons would be turned back. The blockade would last until the Russians removed the missiles.

The Russians soon responded. Several of their ships reversed course. At first Khrushchev uttered hostile words. He then offered to remove the missiles from Cuba, if the United States would remove missiles from Turkey.

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<sup>1</sup>The New York Times (September 12, 1962), 16.

The offer was refused. Despite the refusal, on October 28th Moscow radio announced that the missiles were being dismantled and were to be shipped back to Russia.

The United States then attempted to obtain the right to inspect Cuba to make sure the Russians kept their word. Castro refused to allow any inspection teams on the island. The United States did not push the issue. The following article entitled "October, 1962--The Cuba Crisis, Nuclear War was Hours Away," indicates what was at stake during the crisis:<sup>2</sup>

*[The article is a description of the tense time just before Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the missiles from Cuba. Everything pointed to a nuclear war unless Khrushchev made the move he did.]*

3. A question raised by many was why the Russians placed the missiles in Cuba. Fidel Castro, in an interview with the French Journalist Jean Daniel, supplied one answer:<sup>3</sup>

*[The article indicates that Kennedy implied to Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, that an American invasion of Cuba was being contemplated. When he told Khrushchev of this the Russians decided to send missiles to Cuba as a possible retaliatory measure in case of attack. It was felt that conventional military aid would not prevent the attack.]*

4. Other opinions exist about Russia's motivation. Perhaps the next two selections may suggest another one to you. The first is from a speech made by Premier Khrushchev on May 24, 1955 before a meeting of the Soviet Union's East European military allies:<sup>4</sup>

*[Khrushchev proposes the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other nations and the closing down of all military bases on foreign territory. He suggests as a first step the reduction of western troops on these territories. He claims, however, that these proposals are rejected by the United States and NATO.]*

<sup>2</sup> Newsweek (October 28, 1963), 24-25.

<sup>3</sup> Jean Daniel, "Unofficial Envoy," New Republic (December 14, 1963) 18.

<sup>4</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition With Capitalism (E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., New York, 1960), 429.

The second is a map which appeared in Newsweek:<sup>5</sup>

The map indicates the great extent to which bomber bases, missile sites and Polaris submarines surround the Soviet Union.

5. Some people wondered why the Soviet Union gave in. Secretary of Defense McNamara and Representative Jamie L. Whitten discussed this subject when McNamara appeared before a Congressional Committee.<sup>6</sup>

Representative Whitten of Mississippi suggested to McNamara that the American people are upset because they think there might have been some "deal" between the American Government and the Soviet Union. McNamara replied that if Americans thought this they didnot understand the situation as the American government was fully prepared to go to war against the Soviet Union.

6. Nuclear physicist Eugene Rabinowitch sees the cause of the Russian action in placing the missiles in Cuba and their reason for removing them as being closely linked. His article appeared in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists of which he is one of the co-editors and founders.<sup>7</sup>

Rabinowitch argues that the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba in order to have a "first-strike" capacity equal to the United States which would be recognized by the United States and, therefore, could be used as a threat in diplomatic negotiations. With the failure of the "Cuban gambit" the Soviet Union would have to postpone "diplomatic offensives." Rabinowitch concludes that an equalization in first strike capacity, which growth in the number of rockets and their "hardening" underground or in submarines are likely to bring about, will cause both sides "to go closer and closer to the brink, in the hope that the other will 'chicken out' first."

7. All American presidents have been subject to criticism. John F. Kennedy was no exception. One of the harshest articles appearing anywhere was contained in the January 29, 1963 issue of the National Review.

<sup>5</sup>"U. S. Nuclear Might Abroad," Newsweek (November 5, 1962), 34.

<sup>6</sup>"McNamara Says No Deal Involved in Removal of Missiles from Cuba," Aviation Week and Space Technology 78 (April 1, 1963), 35.

<sup>7</sup>Eugene Rabinowitch, "After Cuba: Two Lessons," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, (February, 1963), 2-4.

written by David Lowenthal. It was entitled "U. S. Cuban Policy: Illusion and Reality."<sup>8</sup>

Lowenthal contends that Kennedy should have demanded the departure of the Russians themselves, as well as their missiles. He also insists that the United States should have held elections under U. N. supervision. Kennedy should have extended the blockade "to almost all shipping." He cites the fact that we cannot inspect Cuba to see if the Russians have carried out their word, and our pledge not to invade Cuba, as indications that we are no longer concerned with the Cuban peoples' welfare. He says such decisions confirm Communist suspicions of Western decline and will cause them to miscalculate our intentions.

8. A Senate sub-committee which investigated whether or not Russia lived up to her word issued a report that many found disquieting:<sup>9</sup>

The report indicated that the United States had no reliable information on the number of Russian troops and missiles in Cuba.

9. Another person who found much to be unhappy about was Newsweek Columnist Raymond Moley:<sup>10</sup>

Moley says that Cuba is in a strategic position and that, although the missiles and bombers may be gone, nothing is preventing the Soviet Union from carrying on espionage and subversive activities, especially "concerning space and missile activities at Canaveral."

10. U. S. News and World Report on November 26, 1962 reminded its readers that the Cuban problem was not yet solved.<sup>11</sup>

The article states that Cuba will continue to be "an active base for Communist troublemaking" and points out propagandistic activities and arms shipments as indications of this.

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<sup>8</sup> National Review, (January 29, 1963), 61-63.

<sup>9</sup> Katherine Johnson, "Senate Group Says Cuban Data Unreliable," Aviation Week and Space Technology (May 20, 1963), 19.

<sup>10</sup> "Expendable Missiles," Newsweek (December 24, 1962), 68.

<sup>11</sup> "Cuba Will Continue to Cast Its Shadow," U. S. News and World Report (November 26, 1962), 40-41.

11. Many have seen fit to defend Kennedy's policies during the missile crisis. One such defender is the British writer, Desmond Donnelly.<sup>12</sup>

Donnelly interprets Kennedy's actions at the time of the Cuban missile crisis as "one of the classics" of skillful diplomacy which helped regain the confidence of the West "in the American capacity and will to lead."

12. Another Kennedy defender is Walter Lippmann:<sup>13</sup>

Lippmann describes what the consequences of a nuclear war would be and commends Kennedy for aiming to achieve limited goals so that nuclear war could be averted. He contends that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are appeasers because they have the prudence to not drive their adversaries "into a corner."

13. Richard Rovere found other reasons for supporting Kennedy's policies:<sup>14</sup>

Rovere argues that the Russian presence in Cuba is not necessarily a bad thing as the cost of occupation would be enormous if we invaded because of the Guerrilla warfare that would be bound to continue, our defeat of Castro would cause sympathy for him, the presence of Russian troops hurts Castro's personal prestige, and their presence gives us, in a sense, a "hostage" in the Western Hemisphere.

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<sup>12</sup>Desmond Donnelly, Struggle for the World, The Cold War: 1917-1965 St. Martins Press, New York, 1965), 447.

<sup>13</sup>Walter Lippmann, "Cuba and the Nuclear Risk," The Atlantic Monthly (February, 1963), 56-57.

<sup>14</sup>Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," The New Yorker (March 2, 1963), 129-130.

SECTION VIII  
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Russian experts tell us that changes have taken place in the Communist world since the death of Stalin in 1953. The Russians seem to be experimenting with their economy. Increased amounts of individual freedom is allowed. Relations between Russia and China and between Russia and the East European nations are evolving along new lines. Even attitudes toward the non-Communist world may not be static.

This section will examine these changes with a question in mind: what implications do these changes have for future Russian-American relations?

1. Communism preaches that public ownership should replace private ownership. Russia's economy under the Communists has always featured central planning. Bureaucrats and not consumers have dictated production schedules. There has been a great shortage of consumer goods. The following articles indicate what may now be happening to these traditional patterns.

The first is from Business Week:<sup>1</sup>

The article indicates that the Russian economy is taking the consumer into consideration more now than ever before and is producing more and better products for ordinary family living because of the greater demand and discrimination. However, top priority is still given to those sectors in the economy "that enhance the nation's power."/

The second article is from Time:<sup>2</sup>

The article reveals the genesis and growth of experimental programs in the Soviet Union in which consumer-goods factories sold goods to retail stores on the basis of negotiated prices and the stores told the factories what the customers wanted. Factories were judged on the kinds of profits the stores made on the goods sold. Two factories were allowed to start this under Khrushchev and it has expanded radically under Kosygin, with the expectation that such a system will eventually be extended to all Soviet industry.

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<sup>1</sup>"Russians Get More Pie," Business Week (July 20, 1963), 50-51.

<sup>2</sup>"Russia - Borrowing from the Capitalists," Time (Feb. 12, 1965), 23-24.

2. Freedom of expression was not allowed under Stalin. Those who attempted to exercise this freedom were frequently imprisoned or executed. Conditions after Stalin's death were discussed in an Atlantic article entitled "Russia in Transition."<sup>3</sup>

The article is a discussion of the transitions from literary repression to freedom and back to repression since Stalin's death. Although literary works that depicted negative aspects of Russian life were at first allowed, Khrushchev decided that "a little freedom . . . could be a dangerous thing" and demanded that the bright aspects of Russian life predominate in all literary works.

3. In 1949 the Chinese Communists completed the conquest of their country. At the time this conquest was seen as greatly increasing the power of the men in the Kremlin.

During recent years the relations between the two Communist giants have not been completely harmonious. This map along with captions help explain why:<sup>4</sup>

The map indicates the three areas between the northern Chinese border and the Soviet Union which were acquired by the U.S.S.R. from China between 1858 and 1881.

4. During the feud between the two Communist giants, news items such as the one below have become common.<sup>5</sup>

The article reviews an article in the Soviet-controlled World Marxist Review which mentioned China's insistence that Soviet leadership be purged and counterattacked by challenging "pseudo-revolutionary phraseology" and "dogmatism" and demanding that other Communist parties oppose China's "insistence that only armed force can achieve socialism." The article contends that in disputes between the U.S.S.R. and Red China the Chinese are seldom the victors.

<sup>3</sup>Ernest J. Simmons, "Russia in Transition," Atlantic Monthly (May, 1959), 70, 71.

<sup>4</sup>Newsweek (March 25, 1963), 41.

<sup>5</sup>"China vs. K: Point of No Return?" Newsweek 61 (March 25, 1963), 43.

5. Although Eastern Europe has always been a concern of the United States, Hungary has been of particular interest since the Hungarian Revolution.

C. L. Sulzberger wrote the following article "Hungary Between Two Symbols":<sup>6</sup>

*[/The article reveals that the present leader of Hungary, Janos Kadar, is attempting to carry out many of the principles for liberty behind the 1956 revolution; except he is trying to do this within a Communist framework.]*

6. In speaking about relations with the West, one phrase bandied about by the Russians in recent years is "peaceful coexistence." Nikita S. Khrushchev discusses the concept in the introduction to the American edition of his book, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism:<sup>7</sup>

*[/Khrushchev takes the position that since neither the United States nor the Soviet Union want war and yet have different social systems the preservation of peace must be based on "peaceful coexistence", i.e. competition in economic, technological and cultural fields rather than military.]*

7. Khrushchev delivered a similar message but in a less friendly tone in a speech given after the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>8</sup> Fidel Castro was in the audience.

*[/Khrushchev insists that the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to spread Communism beyond its borders but that only a "bloody fool" or a child would not be afraid of war.]*

8. In an effort to lessen tensions, the United States and the Soviet Union have signed a number of international agreements. The U. S. government announced one such accord on November 21, 1959:<sup>9</sup>

On the twenty-first of November in Moscow, there were concluded negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of

<sup>6</sup> C. L. Sulzberger, The New York Times (July 18, 1965), 8E.

<sup>7</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, For Victory in Peaceful Competition with Capitalism, viii.

<sup>8</sup> Alexander Werth, Russia at War, xi-xii.

<sup>9</sup> "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Cooperation in Exchanges in the Scientific Technical, Educational and Cultural Fields in 1960-1961," Department of State Bulletin, XLI, (December 7, 1959), 848.

Soviet Socialist Republics on exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, and cultural fields between the two countries for 1960-61. . . .

The negotiations were conducted in a spirit of good will with both sides noting with satisfaction that the fulfillment of the previous two-year agreement on exchanges in the cultural, technical, and educational fields between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., signed on January 27, 1958, had been of mutual benefit. . . .

9. The United States and the Soviet Union announced in June 1963 that they had reached another agreement:<sup>10</sup>

The article indicates that an agreement has been made between the United States and the Soviet Union to have a teletype link between Washington and Moscow.

10. On August 26, 1963 President Kennedy sent to the Senate the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which the United States had just negotiated with the Soviet Union:<sup>11</sup>

The President's Message

The White House, August 8, 1963

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

11. It would be misleading indeed to assume that all areas of friction between Russia and the United States have been eliminated. One very conspicuous area of friction is Vietnam, as is shown in the following item from Newsweek:<sup>12</sup>

The article reports on a statement from Cleveland industrialist, Cyrus Eaton, in which he quoted Kosygin as saying that the U.S.S.R. would combine with China against the United States in Vietnam if necessary. Although the State Department gave little weight to Eaton's statement, Dean Rusk did declare that a larger war would not move the United States from Southeast Asia.

10 "Open Wire to Kremlin," Business Week (June 29, 1963), 36.

11 Department of State Bulletin, XLIX (August 26, 1963), 316.

12 "Vietnam: Will Moscow Move?", Newsweek (June 7, 1965), 33.

12. The possibility of coexisting peacefully with the Russians has not been uncritically accepted by all Americans. Some have voiced mild skepticism, while others have denounced the mere mention of the idea.

President Kennedy was one who publicly voiced mild skepticism. He did so in a speech given on the first anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis.<sup>13</sup>

*/*Kennedy contends that, although Soviet-American relations have changed, there is no assurance that that change is permanent. The differences that still exist should be recognized and the continued possibilities of war should be realized.*/*

13. At the time of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 Christopher Emmet, Chairman of the American Friends of Captive Nations, advocated that economic sanctions be adopted against Russia. In supporting his proposal he said:<sup>14</sup>

*/*Emmett views the attempts of the Soviet Union to replace the cold war with "peaceful coexistence" as attempts to weaken NATO and encourage divisive quarrels between western nations.*/*

14. In a paid magazine advertisement Walter E. Ditwars, President of The Gray Manufacturing Company, voiced his sentiments in no uncertain terms:<sup>15</sup>

*/*The article uses the example of Soviet Chief of State Voroshilov (who once had 11,000 Czarist officers killed and their wives and daughters sent to army brothels) to point out that the Russians are really the same inhumane people they always were and cannot be trusted.*/*

15. Eugene Rabinowitch takes a different view.<sup>16</sup>

*/*Rabinowitch discusses the possibilities for "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union. He notes that the three alternative military policies are: "all-out arms race, stabilized deterrence (arms control), or disarmament, and contends that such policies

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., (October 28, 1963), 26.

<sup>14</sup>Christopher Emmet, "Should U.S. Have Helped Hungary More?" Foreign Policy Bulletin, 36 (May 15, 1957), 133.

<sup>15</sup>National Review (November 10, 1956), back cover.

<sup>16</sup>Eugene Rabinowitch, "After Cuba: Two Lessons," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (February, 1963), 4-7.

cannot be divorced from foreign policy. He argues that there is a need to search for a new political doctrine other than "containment." He interprets recent changes in Soviet policies as being moves from expansionist policies to a desire for equal status in world affairs." He feels that this move toward stabilization is being "speeded up by the growth of a new revolutionary force in China." The rise of Red China might help the United States and Soviet Union "bury the hatchet" and agree to maintain existing boundaries and the existing political status, as they seem to have done in the past ten years. There should be sympathy on both sides, however, for the aspirations of nations under the yoke of either the Western or Soviet systems. He concludes by suggesting peace and cooperation could be engendered by increased cultural and scientific exchanges and cooperative efforts. /